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1 Introduction
The Web nowadays shifts towards and provides more and more tools for online collaboration.
Wikis belong to such tools and one of the goals of semantic enhancements of wikis is to further
support the collaboration of users. Imagine an enterprise and a particular team working in it on
a project. It is common nowadays that the team has members who meet physically only rarely
or never and the tools used by different team members are diverse. In such an environment,
semantically enhanced tools are even more important.
A wiki contains diverse facts and is a tool for maintaining and storing them by many differ-
ent people. The facts can be used to infer additional data and metadata using reasoning. But
the data upon which the inference is done are not static, they change and, in the wiki-world,
versioning is expected when changes occur. In presence of reasoning and changes due to the
reasoning itself and other people collaborating, the system can become complex and not trans-
parent which is why explanation of the systems actions (and inactions) is desirable. Reason
maintenance provides a basis for both explanations and revision/versioning for reasoning. As
a consequence, inconsistency detection is an issue in reason maintenance. Reasoning in col-
laborative contexts, e.g. in wikis, calls for explanations, revisions/versioning, and detection of
inconsistencies.
In the next section, a motivating scenario is presented which is followed by an overview of
belief revision a reason maintenance techniques and in the final section these techniques are
related to explanations and to current semantic web technologies such as RDF and OWL.
2 Motivating Scenarios
One important area was determined in social media where reasoning could be of significant
value and that is tagging [9]. Lets begin with a motivating example that will outline how a
user could wish to use the tagging system.
2.1 Scenario 1 - Specification review
Consider a wiki which is used to keep track of development of a software. The wiki contains
various content documenting the whole development process. For example there are pages
describing the requirements, use cases and feature specifications. Developers use the wiki
do describe and analyze features they work on and these are later used by managers to make
reviews and by documentators to produce documentation. This way they share information and
cooperate. To facilitate the cooperation, the wiki could be enhanced by rule based reasoning.
Imagine a set of rules which expresses that each feature specification is a specification, each
component specification is a specification, each specification that is not revised needs a review
and if something that needs review has been assigned a reviewer then the thing should be on
the reviewer’s todo list. See the table Rules 1 which express formally the rules just described.
The following scenario describes a process during which the user uses the wiki to describe a
state of a software feature specification. In the diagrams, red means a newly added tag, blue
means that the tag was already present. The text next to arrows indicates who takes the action
indicated in the next square diagram.
Consider a page tagged by the user with a featureSpecification tag. Then, thanks to rule
R1, the system infers the tag specification. Once this tag is present, KiWi can use rule R3 to
infer the needsRevision tag because the tag revised is not present. See Figure 1.
1
featureSpecification(x) → specification(x) R1
componentSpecification(x) → specification(x) R2
specification(x) ∧ ¬revised(x) → needsRevision(x) R3
needsRevision(x) ∧ reviewer(x, r) → todo(x, r) R4
Rules 1: Tagging rules 1
featureSpec
specification
featureSpec specification
needsRevis
featureSpec
kiwi : add (R1) kiwi : add (R3)user : add
Figure 1: System infers two new tags after the user adds the “featureSpec” tag.
Then a user tags the page with the tag reviewer(John), see Figure 2. Presence of this new
tag enables KiWi to infer a new tag using rule R4.
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
todo(John)
user : add kiwi : add (R4)
Figure 2: Deduction of tags with variables.
So far the scenario was only a straight-forward usage of tagging by user and by the system
based on predefined rules. Now we will explore what interesting changes can be made in this
state. There are several:
Change 1 User removes the reviewer(John) tag.
Change 2 Or the user changes the featureSpecification tag to componentSpecification tag.
Change 3 Or the user removes the needsRevision tag.
Change 4 Or the user adds a revised tag.
We will explore these changes one by one, discuss them and point out some important
features that KiWi will have to support in order to be able to realize this scenario.
Change 1 In software management context it can easily happen that it changes who is in
charge of a task. If tagging was used to facilitate keeping track of reviewers then it would be
desirable to be able to remove the reviewer tag and later replace it with the same tag but a
different user. Then it is natural to expect that Kiwi will notice that the todo(John) tag is no
longer justified and will remove it, see Figure 3.
2
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
todo(John)
featureSpec specification
needsRevis
todo(John)
kiwi : removeuser : remove
Figure 3: Removal of the “reviewer(John)” tag causes removal of the “todo(John)” tag.
Change 2 It may well happen that a user by mistake tagged something as featureSpecification
which in fact is a component specification. Therefore he or she changes the tag, see Figure 4.
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
todo(John)
componentSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
todo(John)
user : change
Figure 4: Change of a tag for a similar one.
Then the system has to revise all derivations based on the former featureSpecification tag.
This can, but doesn’t necessarily have to, be done as in Change 1 by removing the first tag and
adding the second one. The difference is that there clearly is space for optimization in this case.
The system could be able to determine that inferences based on the featureSpecification tag
would actually be the same as the ones based on the componentSpecification tag.
Change 3 Although there is a rule saying that each specification needs a revision, in real
world it can happen that some specification is an exception to this rule. It is a question whether
the system should support such a use case. If we assume that removing tags is supported in
the system and if we furthermore assume that we do not want to differentiate between user
generated and system generated tags then it is desirable that the user is able to remove any
system generated tag as well.
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
todo(John)
featureSpec specification
reviewer(John)
todo(John)
user : remove kiwi : remove
Figure 5: Removal of the “needsRevis” tag creates an exception to the rule R3.
It is natural to expect that if the user removed the needsRevision tag the system would
remove tags automatically generated because of the presence of the needsRevision tag (rather
than reintroducing this tag right after the user removed it, effectively blocking removal of that
tag), see Figure 5.
3
Change 4 The fourth possible change concludes the scenario. After the specification was
reviewed, a user can tag it as revised, see Figure 6.
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
todo(John) revised
featureSpec specification
needsRevis reviewer(John)
revisedtodo(John)
user : add kiwi : remove
Figure 6: Non-monotonic removal of two tags after addition of the “revised” tag.
Again, the system has to notice that the todo(John) tag is no longer justified because now
revised is provable and therefore the tagging conflicts with rule R3.
This – admittedly oversimplified – scenario indicates some requirements on reasoning and
reason maintenance of the system. We see that non-monotonicity is required as the Change
4 indicates: adding a new fact removes some previously derived fact. The system has to
support exceptions to rules to be able to handle Change 3. Change 1 shows the need for reason
maintenance and Change 2 indicates a place for optimization in implementation of the system.
2.2 Scenario 2 - Paraconsistency
Consider another example which reveals a new requirement, see Rules 2. These rules express
that a bug that is not processed is on someone’s todo list. Furthermore it is inconsistent to
have a bug on todo list and at the same time say that it won’t be fixed or tag something both
as processed and notProcessed. The tag wontF ix implies the tag processed. wontF ix means
that the defect will not be repaired.
bug ∧ notProcessed→ todo T1
todo ∧wontF ix→  T2
processed ∧ notProcessed→  T3
wontF ix→ processed T4
Rules 2: Tagging rules 2
Imagine a page tagged as bug and notProcessed, see Figure 7. Because of rule T1 kiwi will
infer the todo tag. Then a developer decides that this bug will not be fixed and tags it as such.
Then the system derives the processed tag using rule T4, see Figure 8.
bug
bug
notProcessed
todo
user : add user : addkiwi : add (T1)
notProcessed
wontFix
bug
notProcessed
todo
Figure 7: Process of tagging a page which describes a defective software feature.
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todo
bug
notProcessed
wontFix
kiwi : add (T4)
processed
Figure 8: Resulting inconsistent state.
These actions created two inconsistencies. The first is due to the rule T2 which says the todo
tag is inconsistent with the wontF ix tag, the second inconsistency originates in the presence of
both notProcessed and processed tags and the rule T3.
We can see that the obvious thing to do is to remove the todo and notProcessed tags.
But how should the system know that it is better than removing the new wontF ix tag (the
user reporting that bug might well like this behaviour after all). This small example reveals a
bigger problem. In collaborative environment where the system is used as a tool in a process of
creative work, inconsistencies are likely to be present. Often the final decision how to resolve
these inconsistencies has to be made by users. So the system should be able to work reasonably
well even if inconsistencies are present and report them to user. That is, the system should be
paraconsistent - inconsistency tolerant. Moreover, it is desirable that the system can pinpoint
the sources of inconsistencies and track derivations based on them. See Figure 9 which depicts
a derivation tree showing the inferences made by KiWi. The red and green circles mark incon-
sistencies and facts used to derive them. From the picture we can easily see that for example
the notProcessed tag is source of both inconsistencies. To learn more about reasoning and
inconsistencies see [9].
Figure 9: The internal inference tree with two inconsistencies.
3 Defeasible reasoning
The specification revision scenario in the previous section depends on the ability to defeat
already derived facts. A rule supports a derivation if there is no evidence of support for its
negated antecedents. In the scenario it was the rule R3 expressing that a specification needs
a revision unless it is already revised. Grigoris Antoniou, in his book about non-monotonic
reasoning [4] gives another intriguing example, consider the following text: “Smith entered the
office of his boss. He was nervous.” At this point the reader of this sentence is likely to infer
that Smith is the one who is nervous. But then he or she continues to read: “After all, he
didn’t want to lose his best employee.” Now the reader has to revise his or her belief because
5
it was actually the boss who was nervous. The previous belief was based on the assumption
that it is usually employees who are nervous when confronted with their boss. But in the
presence of additional information, the belief turned out to be wrong and the conclusion had
to be withdrawn. This kind of reasoning is called defeasible reasoning.
This section draws mainly from the “Defeasible reasoning” article of The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy [40]. The article describes defeasible reasoning as a reasoning where
the corresponding argument is rationally compelling but not deductively valid. Defeasible rea-
soning has been studied since the time of Aristotle and includes many subfields. Two of these
subfields are belief revision and reason maintenance. This section intends to give the reader a
brief high-level overview of the whole field so that it is more apparent where belief revision and
reason maintenance belong.
Two main approaches can be recognized in defeasible reasoning: epistemological and logical.
The epistemological approach studies defeasible reasoning as a form of inference - a process
by which knowledge is increased. This approach studies the characteristics of belief change.
Whereas the logical approach focuses on the consequence relation between sets of propositions.
Defeasible consequence is non-monotonic (in contrast to the deductive consequence that is
monotonic). Defeasible conclusion is valid if it is true in almost all of the models that verify
the premises.
3.1 Epistemological approach.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists three different kinds of the epistemological ap-
proach: John L. Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning, theory of semantic inheritance net-
works and the AGM theory (named after its originators Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson).
John Pollock’s approach is constructive and effectively computable. It is based on non-deductive
inferences - he defines what it is to be a prima facie reason for believing a proposition and what
it means for a belief to be a defeater of another belief. These notions are inspired by the way
a reasonable person would probably think in a situation. Semantic inheritance networks are
similar to John Pollock’s theory - both represent cognitive states by means of directed graphs -
but are less general. In semantic inheritance networks all initial nodes represent individuals and
non-initial nodes represent kinds, categories or properties and link between the nodes represents
either belonging of a individual to a category or relation of “subcategory”. Whereas in John
Pollock’s theory, the nodes represent propositions and links between them represent relation of
“being prima facie reason for”. Semantic inheritance network cannot represent some inference
relations that John Pollock’s theory can. They also include a principle for prioritizing more
specific rules to more general ones.
The AGM theory is a formal theory of belief revision developed by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson [1, 2]. It tries to answer the question what to do in the case when an agent beliefs
a set of propositions and a change (addition or retraction of a proposition) has to be carried
out. If a proposition is added which is inconsistent with the original belief set then the agent
has to revise the belief set by retracting some beliefs so that the belief set is consistent again.
The problem is that logic itself does not provide any reason to prefer removal of one belief over
another. Therefore it is necessary to rely on additional information about these propositions.
The AGM theory states so called “rationality postulates” which characterize general properties
that the revision should conform to. The main idea is that the revision should make a minimal
change to accommodate the new information consistently.
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3.2 Logical approach.
Logical approaches study the non-monotonic consequence relations which are defined on propo-
sitions, not on beliefs of an agent. Therefore the focus is not the epistemology, although this
approach has implications for epistemology too.
A consequence relation is monotonic iff if a formula follows from a set of formulas then it
follows also from all supersets of this set. Any consequence relation which fails this condition
is non-monotonic. There are various desirable properties that the non-monotonic/defeasible
consequence relation should have and the logical approaches differ in the set of properties
that their consequence relation satisfies. In the following, a brief overview of the main logical
approaches is given. For a comparison of these techniques see [40].
One of the first defeasible systems was the Reiter’s default logic. It is based on the use
of default rules. A default rule allows derivation of its consequence only when its prerequisite
holds and its justifications are consistent with the current set of beliefs. Classical example of
a default rule is the following: bird(x) ∶ flies(x) → flies(x) which says that birds typically
fly (unless they are for example penguins). We can derive that a specific bird flies unless it is
inconsistent with our current set of beliefs. A default theory can have many extensions and
even extensions which are mutually inconsistent. Reasoner can usually choose any of these
extensions to proceed with inferencing.
Non-monotonic logic I by McDermott and Doyle [47] was developed just after the initial
Doyle’s truth maintenance system and McDermott and Doyle pointed out their similarity. Non-
monotonic logic I uses a modal operator M “possible”. So a rule p∧Mq → q says that if p holds
and q is possible then infer q. As in default logic, non-monotonic logic I theory can also have
more extensions. Non-monotonic logic I is similar to Autoepistemic logic in that it also uses
a “possibility” modal operator and defines extension of a theory similarly. See section 11.1 for
more about the relation of autoepistemic logic and truth maintenance.
Circumscription developed by McCarthy uses predicate minimization to express default
rules. One or more predicates are selected for minimization and are usually interpreted as
abnormality predicates. Models of the circumscription theory are sought which minimize ex-
tensions1 of these predicates. Default rule can then for example be: P (x) ∧ ¬abi(x) → Q(x)
which says if P (x) holds and x is not abnormal with respect to the i− th abnormality abi then
infer Q(x). McCarthy used circumscription also as an attempt to solve the frame problem.
Other logical approaches include for example preferential logics and logics of extreme prob-
abilities. Circumscription is a special case of preferential logics. Circumscription prefers the
models that minimize the extension of the abnormality predicates. Preferential logics use dif-
ferent kinds of preference relations which also are transitive and irreflexive.
This section presented a brief overview of the main defeasible reasoning approaches. Two of
them are in the focus of this paper: belief revision and truth maintenance because it is closely
related to non-monotonic and autoepistemic logics.
4 Belief revision
Belief revision is a theory formalizing an idea of rational changes to beliefs based on the principle
of minimal change (also called informational economy) which says that as much as possible
information should be retained when changing ones beliefs. This principle is motivated by the
1The extension of a predicate is the set of assignments of values to its arguments that make it true.
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assumption that information is precious and unnecessary losses of it should be avoided. Belief
revision is also referred to as the AGM theory thanks to its originators Alchourrón, Gärdenfors
and Makinson [1, 2]. Belief state is represented by a set of sentences K which is closed under
logical consequence. That is ϕ ∈ K whenever K ⊢ ϕ. Sometimes the belief state is represented
only by a belief base – a set of sentences whose logical closure corresponds to the belief set
just defined. This section provides a closer look at belief revision and draws mainly from
Gärdenfors’s book on Belief revision [28].
There are three kinds of belief changes: expansion, revision and contraction. In expansion a
new sentence is added to a belief set K together with the logical consequences of the addition.
In revision a new sentence contradicting K is added to K in such a way that the resulting belief
set is consistent (so the operation removes some of the old sentences in K). In contraction
a sentence is removed from K together with its consequences not derivable from K without
the sentence. Belief set is a set of sentences closed under logical consequences. The theory
states rationality postulates about revision and contraction operations on a belief set K. The
extension operation can easily be defined as the logical closure of K ∪ {ϕ}.
Revision and contraction operations cannot be defined solely based on logical considerations.
For example consider a belief set K containing among others also the sentences: p, q, r and
p∧ q → r. Suppose you want to revise the belief set by adding ¬r. Then except r itself, at least
one of the sentences p, q, p ∧ q → r has to be removed too to maintain consistency. There is no
purely logical reason to prefer one of these sentences over another. The rationality postulates
formalize an idea what properties should a rational change have.
Lets look at the rationality postulates for the revision operation to give a closer feel of the
theory. Revision of a belief set K by a sentence ϕ is usually designated K+˙ϕ (to distinguish it
from a simple extension which is denoted by K +ϕ).
(RP1) For any sentence ϕ and any belief set K, K+˙ϕ is a belief set.
(RP2) ϕ ∈K+˙ϕ.
(RP3) K+˙ϕ ⊆K +ϕ
(RP4) If ¬ϕ ∉K, then K +ϕ ⊆K+˙ϕ.
(RP5) K+˙ϕ =K if and only if ⊢ ¬ϕ.
(RP6) If ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ, then K+˙ϕ =K+˙ψ.
(RP7) K+˙ϕ ∧ ψ ⊆ (K+˙ϕ) + ψ.
(RP8) If ¬ψ ∉K+˙ϕ, then (K+˙ϕ) + ψ ⊆K+˙ϕ ∧ψ.
(RP1) requires an update of a belief set to be a belief set. (RP2) says that the input
sentence has to be accepted. (RP3) and (RP4) express that revision results in the same belief
set as expansion if ¬ϕ ∉ K. (RP5) states that the resulting belief set can only be inconsistent
in case that ϕ is logically impossible. K denotes the inconsistent belief set containing all
sentences. There is only one such belief set because whenever K is inconsistent, then K ⊢ ϕ for
every sentence ϕ and belief sets are closed under logical consequence. (RP6) says that logically
equivalent sentences result in identical revisions. Postulates (RP7) and (RP8) roughly say that
subsequent changes should be incremental.
The AGM theory similarly states eight rationality postulates for the contraction operation
(denoted K ∸ ϕ). It can then be shown that the two operations conforming to their respective
postulates can be expressed in terms of each other. Revision K+˙ϕ then corresponds to (K ∸
¬ϕ)+ϕ and contraction K ∸ϕ corresponds to K ∩K+˙¬ϕ. Therefore a method for constructing
one of the operations would automatically yield construction of the other operation via these
definitions. For a specific example how the contraction operation can be modeled see for example
the book Belief revision edited by Peter Gärdenfors [28].
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Even though the sentences of belief sets are treated as facts and there is no purely logical
reason to prefer one over another; in practice some knowledge is more important than other.
Belief revision theory reflects this fact by introducing the notion of epistemic entrenchment.
The degree of epistemic entrenchment has bearing on what is abandoned from a belief set and
what is retained. Belief revision states fives postulates for epistemic entrenchment. The reason
is to specify a unique belief set for the contraction and revision operations and thus making
them into functions. In the following, ϕ < ψ and ϕ ≤ ψ represent that “ϕ is epistemically less,
resp. at least as, entrenched as ψ”.
(EE1) If ϕ ≤ ψ and ψ ≤ χ, then ϕ ≤ χ. (transitivity)
(EE2) If ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ϕ ≤ ψ. (dominance)
(EE3) For any ϕ and ψ,ϕ ≤ ϕ ∧ψ or ψ ≤ ϕ ∧ ψ. (conjunctiveness)
(EE4) When K ≠K, ϕ ∉K iff ϕ ≤ ψ, for all ψ. (minimality)
(EE5) If ψ ≤ ϕ for all ψ, then ⊢ ϕ. (maximality)
The postulates specify what is a minimal change in which situation (for example (EE2)
says that it is a smaller change to give up ϕ, if either ϕ or ψ has to be given up, because if ψ
was to be removed then ϕ would have to be removed too because ψ follows from it). Note that
epistemic entrenchment is relative to a belief set - different belief sets have different orderings of
epistemic entrenchment. What is gained from defining the epistemic entrenchment postulates is
an explicit definition of a contraction function in terms of the ordering ≤. This means that the
problem of constructing revision and contraction function can be transformed to the problem of
providing an ordering of epistemic entrenchment. Gärdenfors discusses also other approaches
to constructing revision and contraction functions.
As Gärdenfors points out, belief revision could also be a useful tool to study non-monotonic
inferences. There is a connection between belief revisions and the meaning of conditional
sentences. Conditional sentence is a sentence of the form “if ϕ is the case then ψ is the case”
or “if ϕ was the case then ψ would be the case”. If the condition ϕ is in contradiction with
the current belief state then the conditional is called a counterfactual. It was argued that a
formal semantics for counterfactuals is of great value for many problem areas within AI, in
particular since they form the core of non-monotonic inferences. The semantics of conditionals
can be based on F.P.Ramsey’s test: 1. add ϕ hypothetically to the belief state 2. check if the
result leads to a contradiction 3. if yes, then make minimal adjustments to the belief state to
restore consistency, but don’t change ϕ 4. consider whether or not ψ can be accepted in this
adjusted belief state. Gärdenfors presents further analysis of this test and concludes that the
test is inconsistent with (K+˙4). However, if updating (due to Katsuno and Mendelzon) is used
instead of revision in formulating the Ramsey test, then this combination is consistent.
From the computational point of view, the problem of belief revision is hard. The problem
of deciding whether ψ ∈ Cn(K)+˙ϕ is already co-NP-complete [49]. Eiter says that this problem
amounts to the evaluation of the counterfactual “if p were the case then q would be the case”
over K under the respective change semantics and shows that evaluating a counterfactual is
for many of the proposed change operators complete for the class ΠP
2
, which means that it is
unrealistic to expect a polynomial algorithm for evaluating counterfactuals under the respective
semantics, even if an algorithm can solve arbitrarily many NP-complete problems at no cost
[24]. Eiter shows that the problem is easier if the formulas are Horn clauses. It is also easier
when the size of the knowledge change (formula p) is bounded by a constant. But the problem
becomes tractable only if both restrictions are considered simultaneously. Eiter concludes that
it is therefore important to seek suitable restrictions for the various formalisms to eliminate all
sources of intractability. To the best of our knowledge, there still was not done very much in
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this direction.
Belief revision seems to lag behind reason maintenance when it comes to practical imple-
mentations. This is supported for example by Liberatore’s and Schaerf’s note that to the best
of their knowledge only Winslett in [62] proposed an algorithm for belief revision [41]. In their
paper they show relationship between belief revision operators and circumscription and claim
that this correlation can be leveraged to a number of existing circumscription algorithms to be-
lief revision. Circumscription is not the only non-monotonic theory that belief revision relates
to. Nebel showed a close correspondence of belief revision and default reasoning [49]. Goro-
giannis and Ryan also say that implementations of belief revision are scarce but they present
implementation of propositional belief revision using Binary Decision Diagrams [32] and apply
it in the area of fault diagnosis. As Dixon and Foo point out, the major difficulty in implement-
ing belief revision lies in the fact that it operates on infinite belief sets whereas for practical
implementation this has to be changed to some finite representation but in finite representations
new problems arise [18].
5 Reason maintenance
The term reason maintenance refers to a variety of knowledge base update techniques which
are all based on similar design - they are divided into the inference engine and the reason
maintenance parts. The original term for these techniques was truth maintenance as Jon Doyle
named it in his Master thesis and technical report at MIT [19]. Later he however preferred the
name reason maintenance for being more precise and less deceptive [21]. Both terms are used
in this paper due to the fact that all abbreviations of the names of the algorithms still end with
the TMS suffix.
5.1 Introduction
Reason maintenance systems are usually designed to address a problem solving task, such as
fault diagnosis, but are applied in other areas too, as it is demonstrated in later sections. The
fundamental design choice that all the reason maintenance algorithms share is the division
of the problem solver into two components: an inference engine and a TMS (see Figure 10).
The inference engine is usually first order, operates on a set of rules representing the domain
knowledge and communicates the inferences to the TMS. Responsibility of the TMS is to
determine what facts are believed and which are not believed given the information received
from the inference engine. The TMS records and uses this information in form of justifications
(see Section 7 for details).
Figure 10: Two components of a problem solver.
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Forbus [27] lists four problem solver issues that justifications facilitate:
• Problem solver can generate explanations by tracing justifications for a belief.
• Sources of a wrong conclusion or a contradiction can be traced via justifications.
• Justification provide a cache of inferences and keep track of which worked and which did
not.
• Problem solver can do default reasoning because justifications contain assumptions ex-
plicitly.
Reason maintenance systems provide a general framework for building problem solvers but,
as Forbus points out, they are not always appropriate. One of the crucial features of a TMS is
the justification caching. Some inferences may be computationally very expensive and therefore
the problem solver should avoid recomputing such inferences, which is exactly where the cached
justifications help to improve performance. On the other hand, if running rules is inexpensive,
then the performance advantage of justification caching is lost and the memory overhead of
keeping always all justifications may become unjustified. This problem has however been already
partially addressed in the newer, modified, TMS algorithms described in later sections.
5.2 TMS algorithms overview
In the next sections, the basic TMS algorithms as well as their modifications are described:
Mon. JTMS Monotonic justification based TMS - a simplification of the
original non-monotonic JTMS.
Nonmon. JTMS The original non-monotonic, justification based TMS.
LTMS Logic TMS - a JTMS based TMS modified to to accept
arbitrary clauses.
ATMS Assumption based TMS - de Kleer’s TMS designed to solve
some of JTMS’s shortcomings.
HTMS Hybrid TMS - by de Kleer, combines advantages of
JTMS/LTMS and ATMS.
ITMS Incremental TMS - designed to improve LTMS context
switch performance.
Each of these algorithms has its own problem domain where it performs the best. An ex-
ception is perhaps the HTMS which combines features of the JTMS and ATMS and behaves as
the former or the latter depending on its usage. Note that, unlike belief revision, reason main-
tenance is more pragmatic; it started with practical implementations and formal description
and theory came only later.
6 Preliminaries
This section introduces definitions of terms needed and used in later sections.
Literal If A is an atom then both A and ¬A are literals. Atom is a symbol in logic that can
take the value either true or false.
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Clause A clause is a disjunction of finitely many literals.
Horn clause Horn clause is a clause that contains at most one positive literal. It is usually
written as L1 ∨ . . . ∨Ln → L, where n ≥ 0 and L is the only positive literal.
Definite clause Definite clause is a Horn clause that has exactly one positive literal.
Unit clause Unit clause is a clause containing only one literal. A set of clauses that contains
a unit clause l can be simplified by removing each clause containing l and by deleting ¬l
in each clause that contains it.
Graph Graph G is an ordered pair G = (V,E) where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of
edges. In an undirected graph, edge is a set of two nodes. In a directed graph, edge is an
ordered pair of nodes. The number of nodes and number of edges are denoted ∣V ∣ and ∣E∣
respectively.
Connected graph Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph. Two vertices u ∈ V, v ∈ V are called
connected if G contains a path from u to v. G is called connected if every pair of distinct
nodes in the graph is connected.
Component Connected component, or a component, of an undirected graph is is a maximal
connected subgraph of the graph.
Strongly connected component Strongly connected component is maximal subgraph of a
directed graph such that for every pair of vertices u, v in the subgraph, there is a directed
path from u to v and a directed path from v to u.
Power set Power set of a set S, designated P (S), is the set of all subsets of S.
7 JTMS
JTMS - justification-based TMS uses so called justifications as a means of tracking dependencies
between inferences made by the reasoner. It is the first TMS that was proposed in 1978 by Jon
Doyle in [19]. Subsequently it has been studied and refined and the other reason maintenance
systems, ATMS, LTMS and HTMS (and their variations) are inspired by it. Doyle’s TMS is
non-monotonic which means that it supports rules such as “if switchClosed unless bulbBroken
then light”. We will however introduce monotonic JTMS first because it is simpler.
A monotonic TMS is a general facility for manipulating Boolean constraints on proposition
symbols [45]. In our terminology we call constraints rules. For example a rule could say
that pages tagged as “bug” and “new” are tagged as “todo”. This rule would have the form
P ∧Q → R where P,Q and R are some proposition symbols interpreted by the outside world.
P could stand for “bug” and the outside interpretation could be “this page describes a bug”.
In the basic JTMS only definite clauses are allowed as rules.
The name “justification-based” TMS results from the way TMS maintains knowledge. For
each proposition it creates a node and connects the nodes by justifications which are (instances
of) rules. Justifications express dependencies between nodes which are then used to update the
graph of nodes when the problem solver communicates a change to the TMS. Nodes that are
justified by justifications with no antecedent are called premises. Given a set of rules and a set
of propositions TMS can be asked about their consequences.
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Generic TMS interface Problem solver communicates new inferences to the TMS and can
ask the TMS about the current state of knowledge. The communication between problem solvers
and different TMS systems is quite similar and was generalized by McAllester who introduced
a generic interface of four different functions [45]. The first interface function, add-rule, adds
a rule to the internal set of rules. The further functions are used to query the TMS about the
state of the knowledge: follows-from, justifying-literals and justifying-rules.
The follows-from function takes two arguments - a literal ϕ and a set of literals Σ. The
function call follows-from(ϕ,Σ) can return three different values: yes, no, or unknown (if only
definite clauses are allowed then yes and no values suffice). The yes and no values are self-
explanatory - it is guaranteed that ϕ follows (resp. does not follow) from the premise set
Σ and the set of internal rules. If the function returns unknown then the system was not
able to determine if ϕ follows although the right yes or no answer would be computable with
corresponding effort [6]. In other words, the TMS answers unknown if it cannot decide between
the two cases efficiently.
If TMS answered yes to a follows-from(ϕ,Σ) question then one can ask the TMS to justify
this answer. This is the purpose of the third and fourth function. ϕ follows from literals returned
by justifying-literals(ϕ,Σ) and rules returned by justifying-rules(ϕ,Σ). Note that using these
functions recursively, justification tree for a derived fact can be created.
Consider the rules P → Q, (P ∧W ) → R, and (Q ∧R) → S. Most TMS algorithms are able
to derive S from these rules and the set of premises P,W [45]. To be able to do this derivation
the follows-from function has to be implemented as transitive [6]. Besides transitivity the
follows-from function is usually implemented to be also reflective and monotonous.
Once a rule is added it can never be removed. Also, justifications (and contradictions)
cannot be retracted. They form a cache of the problem solver - once something has been
derived it will be present so it does not have to be re-derived.
Contradiction handling. The basic JTMS cannot directly detect contradictions because
it is restricted to definite clauses. That is, it can represent literal ϕ but cannot represent
literal ¬ϕ because that is a non-definite singleton clause. Contradiction can be represented as
a special node. Then whenever there are two nodes contradicting the inferencer has to inform
the TMS about the contradiction by supplying a justification with the contradicting nodes in
antecedent and the special contradiction node in consequent. Or, to conform with the TMS
interface functions, rules with  in the head can be allowed. It can be beneficial to create a new
contradiction node for each contradiction as it can facilitate debugging and explanation [27, 9].
We have not yet introduced a TMS interface function that would inform the inferencer
about contradictions. McAllester proposes adding a special propositional symbol called con-
tradictory and using it in the follows-from function: follows-from(contradictory,Σ). Beck-
stein proposes using a separate function contradictory(Σ) which then can be used to define
McAllester’s follows-from function in the case when the first argument is the special symbol
contradictory. Justification functions can be used to find the root cause of the contradiction.
Implementation Because only definite clauses are allowed the follows-from function (and
therefore most of the basic JTMS) can be implemented as a simple forward propagation. Con-
tradictions do not pose a problem because contradiction is only a node with the property that
if it can be derived then the inferencer must be informed. If more general clauses were allowed
then a more complex algorithm would be needed.
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Well-foundedness To be efficient, TMS algorithms try to examine and update as little of the
graph as possible. However, if too little is examined then it can lead into problems with circular
justifications, which is called the problem of well-foundedness [15]. TMS algorithm must be
carefully designed and implemented to maintain only well-founded, non-circular, justifications.
To illustrate the notion an example based on a example by de Kleer [15] follows. Suppose
there are three nodes: “Bug”, “New” and “Todo”. The node “Bug” is a premise, it is always
labeled TRUE. Inferencer uses two rules: Bug ∧New → Todo (R1) and Bug ∧ Todo → New
(R2). Suppose that the system is given justification J for node “New”. Then, using rule R1,
the inferencer infers “Todo” and TMS adds a justification for it to the graph, see Figure 11.
Figure 11: Dependency graph consisting of three nodes and two justifications.
Then, suppose that for some reason J is no longer valid and the system is given a new
justification K for the node “Todo”. In this state the inferencer derives “New” using rule R2
and TMS adds a new justification for this derivation to the graph, see Figure 12. Problem
can arise if K becomes invalidated in this state. Because justifications are never removed from
the dependency graph, justification J is still present in the graph. Therefore “Todo” could
be supported by it which would in turn support “New”. This support would however not be
well-founded because it is circular.
Figure 12: Circular dependency violates the well-foundedness requirement.
JTMS shortcomings JTMS is logically very weak because it allows only definite clauses. It
cannot directly represent that ¬P is negation of P . It can do it only indirectly by establishing
two nodes, let’s say P and nonP , and a rule saying that these two nodes are in contradiction
with each other: P ∧ nonP → . Note that for JTMS nonP is only a name of a variable, not a
negation of P , it is the problem solver who interprets it as negated P .
Encoding arbitrary clauses in JTMS is possible but requires expansion. Suppose we would
like to encode the clause A∨B∨C. That would require creating six nodes: A,nonA,B,nonB,C
and nonC and a set of definite clauses:
A ∧ nonA→  B ∧ nonB →  C ∧ nonC → 
nonA ∧ nonB → C nonA ∧ nonC → B nonB ∧ nonC → A
Note that similar expansion is necessary for all clauses: to encode A→ B one has to encode
the rule nonB → nonA too. Without the contrapositive rule the JTMS would not be able
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to label A false if B was labeled false. It is also important for the efficiency of backtracking.
Suppose that A1,A2, ...,An underlie a contradiction. That means that the clause ¬A1 ∨ ¬A2 ∨
... ∨ ¬An is true. But JTMS cannot represent it directly. If backtracking uses fixed order and
explores An as the last then it is only necessary to add two rules to the JTMS to represent this
contradiction: A1 ∧A2 ∧ ... ∧A(n−1) → nonAn and An ∧ nonAn →  [27].
These examples show that a greater expressivity in the TMS is desirable. That is the reason
why the LTMS, a logic-based TMS, was devised.
8 LTMS
The LTMS, Logical Truth Maintenance System, was first developed by McAllester in [43, 44].
LTMS is more powerful than JTMS because it can represent general formulas as justifications
and it can also represent negated nodes. On the other hand it also means that its implementation
requires a more sophisticated algorithm.
The implementation of the follows-from function is in the LTMS usually done with a concep-
tually simple procedure known as Boolean constraint propagation, or BCP. Boolean constraint
propagation is similar to the Davis-Putnam algorithm [44, 10] and was shown to be equivalent
to unit propagation, a form of resolution for propositional logic, in the sense that each method
can be simulated by another in constant time [5]. In LTMS, justifications are represented as
general disjunctive clauses. It can be assumed that the set of rules is in conjunctive normal form
(CNF). The nodes can be labeled with one of three different labels: YES, NO, UNKNOWN. Ini-
tially all nodes are labeled UNKNOWN. To compute the consequences of a particular premise
set Σ one assigns the label YES or NO to each proposition symbol in the set of literals Σ
depending on whether that symbol appears positively or negatively in Σ. New labels are then
computed based on local propagation - whenever a new truth label follows from existing labels
and some single rule, that new label is added to the network and propagation continues. If a
set of derived labels ever violates one of the internal constraints, then the special proposition
contradiction is labeled true [45]. This propagation process can be run to completion in time
linear in the total size of the set of rules (clauses) [44]. The follows-from(ϕ,Σ) function simply
runs the BCP algorithm starting with the labels in Σ and determines if a label is derived for the
proposition symbol in the literal ϕ. If a label has been derived and its sign is the same as the
sign of the literal ϕ, then follows-from returns YES, otherwise returns UNKNOWN. Discussion
of implementation of the rest of the functions can be found in [6].
Boolean constraint propagation is not logically complete. For example the literal Q follows
from the rules P → Q and ¬P → Q but does not follow from either rule individually. Therefore
BCP will not infer Q even though Q follows from the rules. The incompleteness of BCP
represents a compromise between functionality and efficiency [45] and amounts to a constructive
bias. Boolean entailment is coNP-complete so no efficient and complete algorithm can be
expected.
Making BCP complete Although BCP is generally incomplete, there is a way to make it
complete and even to control the degree of completeness. The technique exploits an observation
that if the set of propositional formulae are converted to their prime implicates (definition
follows shortly) then BCP is complete. This approach is described for example by de Kleer
in [13]. He observes that many problems, mainly those which need reasoning about physical
world, are local in the sense that each constituent of the problem has a fixed behavioral model.
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Therefore much of the reasoning can be viewed as propagation inside the different models
independently. This observation leads him to the idea to split all formulas describing the
whole problem into separate modules which can then be made complete separately using prime
implicates. TMS can then use a complete inference procedure locally on modules. As a result the
desired functionality can be achieved without incurring substantial performance degradation.
This also enables a dynamic trade-off between completeness and efficiency - to achieve more
efficiency more modules can be created, to achieve more completeness the modules can be
merged. If every formula is regarded as a separate module then the algorithm is equivalent to
the traditional BCP. This technique can be applied to the ATMS too.
De Kleer defines prime implicates as follows. Clause A is subsumed by clause B if all the
literals of B appear in A. Then, an implicate of a set of propositional formulae F is a clause
entailed by F not containing complementary literals. A prime implicate of a set of formulae F is
an implicate of F whose no proper subclause is an implicate of F . For example the conjunction
of clauses ¬x ∨ y ∨ z, x ∨ y ∨ z has one prime implicate: y ∨ z. But usually there is more prime
implicates than the conjuncts in the CNF of the formula [13]. Consider the following example:
¬a ∨ b, ¬c ∨ d, ¬c ∨ e, ¬b ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬e.
These all clauses are prime implicates but there are three more:
¬a ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬e, ¬b ∨ ¬c, ¬a ∨ ¬c.
This example illustrates that the set of prime implicates required to make BCP logically
complete can be extremely large. Therefore it is impractical to exploit this technique directly.
De Kleer points to a number of papers describing a variety of different algorithms for computing
prime implicates. He proves four theorems which say that BCP can be made complete if needed
and that running BCP on the prime implicates of the individual formulae is the same as running
BCP on the formulae. Therefore efficient implementations of clausal BCP can be used. Because
direct use of the algorithm is too expensive, de Kleer discusses several techniques to make it
more efficient. The intuition behind these techniques is that because constructing and storing
implicates is the most expensive part of the algorithm, it should be delayed as much as possible.
De Kleer implemented his algorithm in both LTMS and ATMS and used it in his Qualitative
Process Engine, QPE, to solve qualitative physics problems.
Single-context TMS JTMS and LTMS are single-context operating algorithms. In each
state they manage only one current context where context is the current set of premises and
assumptions. The premises and assumptions describe the current trial to solve the problem
at hand. Problem solvers search the state space by switching the current context. When a
context switch occurs then traditionally JTMS and LTMS will remove all labels, update the set
of premises and assumptions and start the labeling process again. In general problem solving
computing a label of a node may require a costly computation or even calling an external
program. At the same time context switches are likely to occur often. That means that for
many problem solving applications JTMS and LTMS can be inefficient. Therefore new TMS
systems capable of managing multiple contexts were created.
9 ATMS
Many problem-solving tasks require the inference engine to rapidly switch among contexts or
to work in multiple contexts at once. Two examples of such tasks are qualitative reasoning and
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diagnosis [27]. Switching context in JTMS and LTMS requires relabeling nodes which can be
costly and it is the main reason for developing and using ATMS. There are other problems which
de Kleer discusses in [12] but these are mostly related to properties of the original, Doyle’s, non-
monotonic JTMS. In [12] he also analyzes the systems of Doyle [20], Martins [42], McAllester
[44], McDermott [46] and Williams [61] and points out how these TMSs have addressed or failed
to address these problems. Assumption based TMS [11] is similar to the monotonic JTMS but
it avoids such relabeling. In the ATMS implementation the propagation process is independent
of any particular premise set - a single “universal propagation process” pre-computes all answers
to all possible queries [11]. To make the universal propagation process more efficient, the user
can declare an a priori set of “possible premises”. Each possible premise is a literal and every
premise set in every query to the ATMS must be a subset of the set of possible premises.
ATMS context switches are free because the labeling was already precomputed in form of
complex labels for each node. Roughly speaking, this label describes different sets of assumptions
under which the node would be labeled YES in JTMS or LTMS. An ATMS label is a set
of environments where an ATMS environment is a set (a conjunction) of assumptions. A
node holds in an environment if it can be derived from the set of assumptions and the set of
justifications. A nogood is a contradictory environment. Environment is consistent if it is not
a nogood. A context of an environment is the set of nodes that hold in the environment. So
while a justification describes how a node depends on its antecedents, an ATMS label describes
how the node ultimately depends on assumptions.
ATMS algorithm guarantees that each label of each node is consistent, sound, complete and
minimal. A label is consistent if all its environments are consistent; it is sound if the node is
derivable from each environment of the label; it is complete if every consistent environment in
which the node is derivable is a superset of some enviroment of the node’s label. The label is
minimal if there are no two environments in the node’s label such that one is the superset of the
other. When a new justification for a node is introduced by a problem solver, an incremental
change of the node’s label is evaluated using the labels of the node’s antecedents. After this
incremental change is made consistent and minimal, it is combined with the node’s old label to
make a new minimal node’s label. Note that once derived, a node is never re-derived in a new
environment. Only its label has to be changed [56].
Consistency JTMS and LTMS insist on consistency in the sense that the current set of
premises and assumptions must be consistent with the rules. There are two reasons for this
according to [11]: 1) the problem solver operates with a single controlled focus, 2) the presence of
inconsistency renders all deductions meaningless. De Kleer argues that only assertions directly
affected by the contradiction should be retracted. The fundamental difficulty is that it is costly
to determine which data are affected. In an assumption-based TMS, one can tell directly
whether a node is affected or not, so demanding consistency is unnecessary. A contradiction
merely indicates that a specific set of assumptions is inconsistent, and that data depending on
them are affected.
When a nogood, a contradictory environment, is detected, it is added to a nogood database.
This environment and its supersets are then removed from all node labels. The nogood database
is kept minimal to prevent examination of environments known to be inconsistent [56].
Complexity If there are n assumptions then there are potentially 2n contexts (recall that
context is the current set of premises and assumptions). There are (n
k
) environments having
k assumptions. De Kleer says that ATMS is practical even when n is as large as 1000 [11].
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The ATMS is then exploring a space of size 21000. There are two observations about contexts
that help to explain the efficiency. First is the fact that a node is in every superset context of
its context as well so it is only necessary to record the greatest lower bound environments in
which a node holds. Similarly, it is only necessary to record the greatest lower bounds of the
inconsistent environments. Second, in cases where most of the environments are inconsistent,
these inconsistencies are identifiable in small subsets of assumptions. Therefore, large parts of
the environment lattice need never be explicitly checked for consistency [11].
The worst case behaviour, when ATMS implementation requires both exponential time and
exponential space to answer a single query, can however be easily realized even in simple cases
[45]. ATMS was created to support problem solvers interested in all the solutions of a problem
and in this case computing all the solutions by ATMS can be more efficient than all the context
switching that would be needed by LTMS or JTMS algorithms.
Figure 13: Example of an ATMS environment lattice.
Example To get a better idea of the notions presented in this section consider Figure 13 which
depicts an environment lattice for assumptions A,B,C, and D. Recall that an environment is
a set of assumptions and there are (n
k
) environments having k assumptions. The lines between
environments represent a subset relationship. From the picture it is easily seen that the top-most
environment is a superset of all environments which in turn all contain the empty environment
as a subset. Inconsistent environments (environments from which it is possible to derive )
are crossed out in the figure and correspond to nogoods. In this case they are result of a
single minimal nogood {B,C}. In ATMS, each fact has a set of environments in which it
holds. In the example in Figure 13, the squared environments denote all environments of the
fact needsRevision(123) (where 123 is a unique identifier of a specific page). The circled
environments represent environments of the fact reviewer(123, john). When the inferencer
deduces a new fact, todo(123, john), (according to rule R4 of Scenario 1 in Section 2.1) then its
set of environments can be determined as the intersection of sets of environments of the first
two facts. The environments from this intersection are both circled and squared in the figure.
The label of the fact needsRevision(123) is the set of greatest lower bounds of the squared
environments: {{D}}. The label of the fact reviewer(123, john) is the set of greatest lower
bounds of the circled environments: {{A,D}}. And the label of the derived fact, todo(123, john)
is the set of greatest lower bounds of the both circled and squared environments: {{A,D}}. In
this simple case each of the labels contains only one environment but it is easy to think of a
bigger example where the labels would contain more environments. For a bigger example see
[11].
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10 TMS modifications
It was soon realized that many applications, including diagnostic ones [16, 17] only consider a
small number of the possible contexts so the ATMS algorithms waste effort exploring contexts
irrelevant to the diagnostic goal [14]. On the other hand, there is usually too much context
switching to use a single-context TMS effectively. This observation led to development of
alternative TMS algorithms which try to focus the ATMS to a smaller set of contexts. One
example is de Kleer’s HTMS - Hybrid Truth Maintenance System [14]. In other applications
such as operating systems of embedded devices even a single context LTMS can be too inefficient
due too unoptimal context switching algorithm and space requirements as justifications can
only be added, not removed. This problem is addressed in several proposals (i.e. [26]) how
to improve the performance of these algorithms, resulting for example Nayak’s and Williams’s
ITMS - Incremental Truth Maintenance System [48] and its further refinements [63].
10.1 HTMS
Hybrid Truth Maintenance System was developed by de Kleer [14] in response to the ineffi-
ciency of ATMS in diagnostic applications. Although diagnostic applications require working
in multiple contexts they rarely need to use all of them and hence the inefficiency. De Kleer
also points out that the idea of a generic TMS interface suggests that JTMS, LTMS or ATMS
are better thought of as algorithms with differing time-space tradeoffs. Therefore they should
be rather referred to as JTMS algorithm, LTMS algorithm and ATMS algorithm. The HTMS
algorithm also has the familiar interface, cf. Section 7, but adapts to the task as problem
solving unfolds.
If the inference engine remains within a single context, then the HTMS behaves like a
conventional JTMS or LTMS and if the inference engine explores all contexts, then the HTMS
behaves like an ATMS. The inference engine can control the computation of the HTMS to only
focus on gathering the most useful information which is relevant to answering queris about the
contexts of interest. De Kleer reports a greatly improved efficiency [14]. For example one task
that did not end after 240 hours of computation using the ATMS was completed in less than
a second with the HTMS. It is important to note that, to exploit the HTMS, problem solvers
have to be redesigned to utilize its features fully.
The HTMS algorithm can be viewed as an ATMS algorithm with three modifications:
• The HTMS only maintains labels with respect to a specified set of context - each context
characterized by a focus environment.
• For every focus environment, the HTMS finds at most one label environment for each
TMS node.
• The HTMS incorporates a scoring function which guides the HTMS to find the single
‘best’ label environment for each node.
The first modification avoids much of the combinatorial explosion encountered using the
ATMS as irrelevant label environments lying outside of the focus environments are not main-
tained. The second modification eliminates the combinatorial explosion where a node has an
exponential number of derivations within the same context. The incorporation of a scoring
function is important in backtracking where one would like to find the smallest nogood sup-
porting the current contradiction. While the ATMS always finds the smallest nogood because
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it finds all of them, the HTMS can be directed to find small ones. The function could also
compute a score based on the probabilities of the assumptions.
The major interface difference between a single-context TMS algorithm and an HTMS algo-
rithm is that if the set of premises is found inconsistent with the set of rules, then the HTMS is
expected to return a constraining nogood which it will find also using the scoring function. The
major interface difference between an ATMS and an HTMS is that the label it maintains for
nodes is incomplete - for each node it maintains a single, low scoring, supporting environment
within the focus. The HTMS algorithm is designed to ensure efficient context switches and
is based on a basic intuition: only compute enough of the ATMS labels that are necessary to
find low-scoring nogoods and answer queries. Also, even though there mey be a large num-
ber of possible label environments for a given set of premises, the HTMS adds only the best
environment to each label.
The HTMS algorithm is based on the incomplete but efficient BCP algorithm. De Kleer
discusses [14] possibilities to make the algorithm complete but rejects them for being too inef-
ficient. He also gives a comparison of the HTMS algorithm to optimal which shows that the
BCP-based HTMS algorithm is nearly optimal for some of the most common ATMS application.
The core of the HTMS algorithm is a best-first propagator which propagates environments
with best scores first. It constantly computes the supporting environments for nodes and caches
the results. When it is asked for a support of a node it first checks the cache and, only if this
is unsuccessful, it tries to find a lowest scoring in focus environment in the node’s label. For
a detailed description of the algorithms please refer to [14]. The worst case complexity of the
HTMS algorithm is O(mac) where m is the number of literal occurrences in justifications (if
there are two justifications one with 2 antecedents and another with 3, then m = 5), a is the
maximum number of assumptions employed in a task and c is the number of contexts explored
[14]. This reveals the hybrid nature of the HTMS - c may approach 2a if the number of contexts
considered are large. On the other hand, if the number of contexts is small, then the complexity
of the HTMS is linear as that of LTMS.
10.2 ITMS
One inefficiency of LTMS that has already been mentioned is that of costly context switches.
When making a context switch, the LTMS algorithm takes a conservative approach and relabels
all nodes regardless of whether it is actually necessary. This observation and the need to build
a highly efficient TMS system for real-time use in embedded devices led to the development of
the Incremental Truth Maintenance System, ITMS [48].
NASA’s Nayak and Williams needed to develop an embedded real-time execution kernel,
called Livingstone [60], that performs a variety of functions such as commanding, monitoring,
diagnosis, recovery and safe shutdown automatically with required response times on the order
of hundreds of milliseconds. They report that LTMS can spend a significant percentage of
its time working on labels that remain constant between contexts which leaves much room for
improvement. On a real-world spacecraft control problem the overhead was 37% on average and
rose to about 670% in the worst case. The ITMS algorithm reduces the overhead approximately
seven times on the spacecraft problem as reported in [48]. The algorithm finds quickly alternate
supports for propositions while guaranteeing well-foundedness and provides a mechanism for
propagating the consequences of newly added clauses before other clauses are deleted, increasing
the number of consequences available to be used as alternate support.
Please note, that this modified algorithm actually addresses the problem highlighted in
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“Change 2” of the motivating scenario from Section 2.1. The change shows that implementing
a change by deleting a fact followed by adding a new fact is not optimal because this way it
is not possible to preserve propagations that hold both before and after the context switch
but that do not hold in the intermediate context. The problem is that the LTMS algorithm
does not first look for ways to resupport nodes before removing their label. But even if it
looked for resupport first it wouldn’t find it in the “Change 2” problem. It would find it if
the componentSpecification tag was added first and only then the featureSpecification tag was
removed. This however may bring another problem because these two tags may be mutually
inconsistent (e.g., a page can have only one specification type). This inconsistency is a barrier
to propagation and overcoming this barrier requires an algorithm for propagating through a
conflict, which the ITMS algorithm provides.
Figure 14: Example of the ITMS resupport problem.
Consider an example in Figure 14 (inspired by an example from [63]). To show the parallel
with the “Change 2” both trees are shown but only the first is referred to in the following text.
Assumption d is to be deleted and assumption a is to be added. Assumption a satisfies clause
C1 and assumption d satisfies clause C2. C1 deduces p logically before d is retracted. When a is
added, C2 becomes unit-open and deduces p. In a LTMS p would first loose support from C1 and
then get support from C2 as d is deleted and a is added. In order to resupport p immediately,
the following condition must be enforced: d has no influence on the literals in C2 other than p.
If d influences another literal other than p in C2, then d can influence two propositions, which
will all be labeled UNKNOWN when d is retracted. It means that C2 can not become unit-
open and therefore can not support p in the new context. It is, however, expensive guaranteeing
this condition because it may involve a complete traversal of the dependency graph. Therefore
Nayak and Williams make the approximation that d does not affect other literals in C2 and
specify under which conditions p can be resupported:
• If p occurs positively (negatively) in clause C1 then it occurs positively (negatively) in
C2. This makes sure that C2 would resupport p while preserving its label.
• All literals in C2 other than p are negative. This ensures that C2 can propagate a label
to p.
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• None of the other literals in C2 depend on p so that C2 can provide p with a well-founded
support.
Ensuring the third condition can be time consuming. Therefore Nayak and Williams pro-
posed a fast approximation that is sufficient for the third condition to hold. Their idea is to
associate a propagation number with each node. The propagation number of a node is equal
to the level at which the node is located in the dependency graph. This allows to replace the
third condition with the following one:
Propagation-number-invariant The prior propagation number of p is greater than the max-
imum of all the other propagation numbers of literals appearing in C2.
This condition is sufficient but not necessary for the original one and therefore the algorithm
may miss resupport opportunities as Williams and Nayak point out [48]. Another problem
occurs when C1 and C2 imply different labels for p. Nayak and Williams use an approximation
in this case too. Propagating through conflict then proceeds as follows:
• Change the label of p from TRUE to FALSE or vice versa. Change the propagation
number of p to a value greater than the maximum of propagation numbers of other
propositions appearing in C2.
• Resupport any propositions that can be inferred by using p with its new label if p appears
in the clause used for resupport.
• Undo propagations based on the previous label of p.
The above “Propagation-number-invariant” guarantees that the algorithms for resupporting
propositions and propagating through conflicts yield well-founded supports.
Nayak’s andWilliams’s experimental results show that on the spacecraft problem the average
performance of the ITMS is only 5% off ideal with worst case overhead of 100%.
10.3 Improved ITMS
The ITMS, although an improvement over LTMS, works only based on approximations which
means that it can miss some opportunities for resupport. This problem was adressed by Guofu
Wu and George Coghill in their Propositional Root Antecedent ITMS [63]. Their method is
based on root antecedents, which are those antecedents with zero propagation numbers, and can
determine the dependency relationship between a node and the rest of the clause accurately
and efficiently.
Thanks to root antecedents Wu and Coghill do not have to approximate how d influences C2
in order to find resupport for p, see Figure 14. If d has an influence on C2, the root antecedents
of the influenced literal in C2 must contain the root antecedents of d. Then the conditions for
p to be resupported are:
• p has to have the same linked label in C1 and C2 so that it can keep the same label in
the new context.
• all other literals in C2 other than p are negative.
• p is influenced by assumption d.
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• d influences no other literals in C2 than p.
Their algorithm for finding resupport of p when d is removed and a added is:
• Change p’s support from C1 to C2. Remove d from the root antecedents of p and add a.
• Resupport nodes that previously depended on p: remove d from their root antecedents
and add a.
• Remove d.
If p does not have the same labels in C1 and C2 then the ITMS must propagate through a
conflict. Thanks to Wu and Coghill’s root antecedents this can be done precisely and efficiently.
Their conditions for propagation through a conflict are:
• p has different labels in C1 and C2.
• d has influence only on p in C2.
The algorithm for propagation through conflict then is:
• Relabel p from TRUE to FALSE or vice versa. From the root antecedents of p remove d
and add a. Change support of p to C2 (from C1).
• Set consequence of C2 to p and consequences of C1 to none.
• Push all clauses of p to a stack and continue propagation based on the new label of p.
• When the propagation stops in a terminal node, d is removed using the LTMS algorithm.
The approximative nature of the original ITMS makes it efficient in many cases but it is
not guaranteed that the propagation will always work so in some cases ITMS may require even
more work than the LTMS. ITMS based on root antecedents does a little more propagation than
Nayak’s and Williams’s ITMS but the propagation is reasonably fast because the dependency
path was already identified and the labels of all the nodes along the propagation path are kept
the same. And the root antecedent ITMS works precisely [48]. Another nice feature of the
improved ITMS is that it can provide explanations immediately without propagation or search
because every node is already associated with their root antecedents. It is useful to note that
the intended application of Wu and Coghill’s ITMS is somewhat different from the one of Nayak
and Williams. Wu and Coghill integrated the ITMS into a model based diagnosis engine for a
chemical plant.
10.4 Fact Garbage Collection for LTMS
In the usual TMSs the size of dependency network grows monotonically as new assumptions
are being added and retracted. This growth may become a limiting factor in applications where
memory is precious. In one fielded application described by Everett and Forbus [26] the time
taken to revise an assumption increased more than fifteen times by the thirtieth change and
by 48th change it filled all available memory and crashed. Their solution to the problem is to
create a fact garbage collector which removes information unlikely to be useful in the future.
The core of the idea is to identify a class of facts that:
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• Make up a significant portion of all the facts.
• Are unlikely to become valid again once they are retracted.
• Are cheap to rederive.
Deleting these facts helps to maintain size of the dependency network but at the same
time assures that possible necessary rederivations are cheap. They applied this Fact-Garbage-
Collecting technique, a term coined by Stallman and Sussman [55], in an intelligent learning
anvironment called CyclePad which is a system used for learning about engineering thermody-
namics. Students using CyclePad change parameters of the simulated system and this way they
develop better intuitions about thermodynamics. In their system one change can have exten-
sive consequences as a typical cycle requires between 10 and 30 assumptions and may result in
derivation of hundreds of additional numerical values. This fact together with the monotonical
growth of TMS dependency network result in slow computation times. To alleviate the problem
they identified numerical assumptions as facts which fit the three criteria described above and
therefore are good candidates for removal. Using their algorithm removing these facts they were
able to make 1000 consequtive retractions and assumptions with significant time improvements
and virtually no growth in data structures.
The algorithm adds an additional step to the normal LTMS retraction algorithm which is
the garbage collection run on facts labeled as UNKNOWN. In this step, for each node it is
checked whether it is garbage-collectable and if yes it is collected. Colletion of a nodes involves
checking for a few conditions that assure that no information is lost if rederivation is needed.
This is necessary in cases where one clause contains both collectable and non-collectable nodes
and it involves creating an auxiliary data structure. This data structure is then used to inform
the inferencer that some additional step is needed to rederive a previously retracted fact.
Everett and Forbus developed this improvement for the LTMS algorithm but they suppose
that all of the concepts are directly applicable to JTMS algorithms too. It is not so clear
whether some equivalent improvemnt would be possible for the ATMS. They also analyzed the
complexity of the algorithm and found it to be linear in the size of the LTMS dependency
network. In best case there also will be no growth in the size of the dependency network, no
matter how many assume/retract cycles are run. On the other hand, in many cases there still
will be growth because non-collectible facts can be introduced as a consequence of a collectible
assumption and such facts are never destroyed. They expect their algorithm to be valuable for
applications which use TMS to provide explanations rather than to guide search.
11 Non-monotonic JTMS
The Doyle’s original JTMS is non-monotonic and therefore it infers not only based on what
information is present but also on what information is not present. In other words, it supports
rules like R3 from Section 2.1: specification(x) ∧ ¬revised(x) → needsRevision(x). That
is, for needsRevision to be supported there must be an evidence of specification and no
evidence of revised. If an evidence of revised appears then needsRevision has to be invalidated.
This JTMS uses a different labeling from the previous ones. A node that is believed (given
rules, assumptions and premises) is labeled as IN, otherwise it is labeled as OUT. So node for
needsRevision would be labeled IN if the node for specification was labeled IN and the node
for revised was labeled OUT. Doyle’s JTMS supports non-monotonic inference: if later revised
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is inferred then revised is labeled OUT and together with it also all consequences depending
on it. It also handles contradiction: if ¬needsRevision is introduced then it finds the source
of the contradiction and tries to resolve it by using dependency directed backtracking, DDB.
DDB then may create justification for revised to resolve the contradiction. This TMS is a
propositional system - nodes represent propositions and the TMS does not understand their
internal structure. In this respect this JTMS is similar to the monotonic JTMS described in
Section 7. And as in the monotonic JTMS, in Doyle’s JTMS dependencies between nodes are
also tracked by means of justifications.
The dependency graph consists of a set N of nodes and a set J of justifications. Justification
has the form < INS,OUTS∣c > where INS and OUTS are subsets of N : INS ⊆ N , OUTS ⊆ N
and c is a node: c ∈ N . INS are the monotonic and OUTS the non-monotonic supporters of
the conclusion c. A labeling assings each node from N label IN or label OUT . Justification
is valid if and only if all its monotonic supporters (INS) are IN and all its non-monotonic
supporters (OUTS) are OUT . Consistent labeling is a labeling where each IN node has a valid
justification. Doyle’s JTMS has similar notion of well-foundedness as the monotonic TMSs -
cycles in labelings have to be avoided. A labeling is said to be well-founded if for every IN node
there exists a chaining of valid justifications back to premises or to OUT nodes. A labeling is
admissible if it is consistent and well-founded. In the dependency network, justifications can
create cycles. It is important to watch out for cycles that contain an odd number of OUT
nodes, so called odd loops. These cycles express a kind of paradox (liar paradox) and the
original Doyle’s labeling algorithm was not able to find an admissible labeling in their presence.
There is a special node for contradiction designated as . Contradiction handling tries to find
an admissible labeling in which  is OUT .
The original labeling algorithm by Doyle entered an endless loop when it encountered a
graph with an odd loop. Goodwin [30, 31] improved this algorithm to at least finish but it still
finds no labeling in presence of odd loops. His algorithm is in most cases linear and uses a special
ordering of strongly connected components of the dependency graph to guide its computation,
for details see Goodwin’s papers or [6]. Junker [35] improved the labeling algorithm to always
find an admissible labeling whenever one exists but his algorithm is not incremental. Dung
proposed a new representation of JTMS and developed an algorithm [22, 23] for it which is
incremental and always finds an admissible labeling whenever one exists. Beckstein [6] reports
also another complete algorithm created by Russinoff [53]. The complete algorithms are however
not practical because the labeling problem is NP-complete [25] so no efficient algorithm is to
be expected.
Non-monotonic JTMS was the first one invented - in 1979 by Jon Doyle in his master thesis
at MIT. People described many problems of this original system (like being single-context,
cumbersome because of non-monotonicity, being described only informally, it was not clear
what the relation to non-monotonic logics is) and the work on them resulted in other systems
like the ATMS or the LTMS. The most important idea seemed to be the separation between
a problem solver and the truth maintenance system which was adopted by all the subsequent
TMSs.
11.1 Dual representation
In the previous text, classical representation of the original JTMS, that straightforwardly cap-
tures dependencies between nodes, was described. In this section the new representation of
JTMS by Dung [22, 23] is presented. This new representation is equivalent to the old one and
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makes dependencies between justifications explicit. It makes it possible to separate the mono-
tonic and non-monotonic parts of the dependency graph. Dung also developed an incremental
algorithm to compute admissible labelings which uses this new representation.
To describe the new representation and to show its relation to the old one several defini-
tions have to be introduced. Let (N,J) be the classical representation, let K be a subset of
J , K ⊆ J , then K ↾ c will denote the set of justifications from K which have c as a conse-
quent: K ↾ c ≡ {j ∈ K ∣j ≡< INS,OUTS∣c >}. The new representation translates justifica-
tions to nodes but not all nodes need to have a justification in the classical representation.
Hence the term completed classical representation: completed classical representation is a pair
(N ⋃NOUT ⋃{Ψ}, J ⋃JOUT ⋃{j}). JOUT = ⋃{jc},NOUT = ⋃{tc} where for every node
c ∈ N ⋃{} which is not a consequent of some justification (J ↾ c = ∅) a new node tc and a
new justification jc =< {tc},{}∣c > are added. Let K be a subset of J ⋃JOUT . A monotonic
dependency MD(j) of the new representation has the form MD(j) =< In(P (K))∣j >, where
In() denotes in-components and j ∈ J ⋃{} is called the consequent of MD(j). Similarly,
a non-monotonic dependency has the form NMD(j) =< Out(P (K))∣j > where Out denotes
out-components of the new representation and j ∈ J is called the consequent of NMD(j).
Let (N,J) be a classical representation of a JTMS and (N ⋃NOUT ⋃{Ψ}, J ⋃JOUT ⋃{j}).
Then for every j ≡< INS,OUTS∣c >∈ J ⋃{j}:
The monotonic dependency is determined as follows:
MD(j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{} if INS = ∅
{(J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ i1, . . . , (J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ ik} if INS = {i1, . . . , ik}
The non-monotonic dependency NMD(j) is determined as follows:
NMD(j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{} if OUTS = ∅
{(J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ o1, . . . , (J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ om} if OUTS = {o1, . . . , om}
Then (J ⋃JOUT ⋃{j},D) is called the dual representation of this JTMS where D =
⋃
j∈J∪{j}
(MD(j)⋃NMD(j)).
Notions such as dual labeling, valid dependency, well-founded and admissible labeling are
defined for the new representation similarly as for the classical representation. A dual labeling
is a function from J ⋃JOUT ⋃{j} to the set {IN,OUT}. Monotonic dependency is valid
iff each its IN-component contains at least one justification labeled IN and non-monotonic
dependency is valid iff all its OUT-components are labeled OUT. Consistent dual labeling is a
labeling where each IN justification has valid dependencies. A dual labeling is said to be well-
founded iff for every IN justification there exists a chaining of valid dependencies going back to
premise justifications, or to OUT justifications. A labeling is admissible if it is consistent and
well-founded.
Except giving these definitions, Dung also proves that the classical and new representation
are equivalent in a sense. More precisely, each admissible labeling of a completed classical
representation corresponds exactly to an admissible dual labeling of the new representation
and vice-versa. He also develops an algorithm to move from one admissible dual labeling to
another which is based on a decomposition of the network in dual representation. DDB must
be called only if all admissible dual labellings are inconsistent. The algorithm is essentially
a chronological backtracking algorithm for the incremental computation of an admissible and
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consistent dual labeling. It uses the observation that in the dual representation the set of non-
monotonic dependencies of each justification contains at most one non-monotonic dependency.
This facilitates treating the non-monotonic cases.
Dung reports [22] that the transformation between classical and dual representation can be
performed in O(∣J ∣ ∗ ∣N ∣) time. This result together with Elkan’s proof of NP-completeness of
the problem of finding an admissible labeling [25] leads to the conclusion that the complexity
of Dung’s algorithm is exponential. Dung also points out that his algorithm has also the
advantage of having provisions for using a preference order between assumption justifications
(justifications having non-empty OUT-components) which gives the problem solver a greater
control over the dual labeling process.
Figure 15: Graphical representation of JTMS dependency graph in the classical representation
(the first graph) and the dual representation (the two graphs on the right side).
Example transformation To clarify the transformation between classical and dual repre-
sentations, an example follows. See Figure 15. The first part of the picture represents a part of
the dependency graph in the classical representation: justification j ≡< {i1 . . . ik},{o1 . . . on}∣c >
which connects the assumptions and premises i1, . . . , ik, o1, . . . , on to the consequent node c. The
second and third part of the picture depict a monotonic dependencyMD(c) ≡< In({j1, . . . , jk}∣c >
and a non-monotonic dependency NMD(c) ≡< Out({j1, . . . , jn})∣c > in the new representation.
Now consider the example in Figure 16. It depicts a part of the Scenario 1 from Sec-
tion 2.1 as a JTMS dependency graph in the completed classical representation. It is the
completed classical representation because the auxiliary nodes NOUT = {tf , tc, tr} and jus-
tifications JOUT = {jf , jc, jr} have already been added. The set of justifications J contains
three justifications: J = {jfs, jcs, jsr}. Monotonic and non-monotonic dependencies of the dual
representation are computed as follows:
MD(jfs) = {(J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ featureSpec} = {{jf}}
MD(jcs) = {(J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ componentSpec} = {{jc}}
MD(jsr) = {(J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ specification} = {{jfs, jcs}}
NMD(jfs) = {} (because OUTS = ∅ in jfs)
NMD(jcs) = {} (because OUTS = ∅ in jcs)
NMD(jsr) = {(J ⋃JOUT ) ↾ reviewed} = {{jr}}
These dependencies are represented by the dual dependency network in Figure 17. The dual
representation clearly separates the monotonic dependenciesMD(jfs),MD(jcs),MD(jsr) and
the non-monotonic dependency NMD(jsr).
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Figure 16: Completed classical representation of part of the Scenario 1 - Specification review.
NMJTMS and non-monotonic logic. For a long time non-monotonic truth maintenance
has coexisted with non-monotonic logic while it has been suggested that there is close rela-
tionship between them [47] but it was not established precisely. Reinfrank in his paper about
logical foundations of non-monotonic truth maintenance [52] sheds more light on this problem.
He shows relation of non-monotonic truth maintenance to Konolinge’s version of Autoepistemic
Logic (AEL) by relating a justification to an AEL-formula of the form La ∧ ¬Lb → c, where L
is a modal operator. Lp is interpreted as “p is believed”. Different versions of AEL-extensions
then correspond to different restrictions on TMS-labellings. He shows that consistent labellings
correspond to weakly grounded AEL-extensions, minimal consistent labellings to moderately
grounded AEL-extensions and well-founded consistent labellings to strongly grounded AEL-
extensions. An AEL-extension of a theory S is a consistent and self-supporting set of beliefs
that can reasonably be entertained on the basis of S [3]. Groundedness refers to the level of
self-supportedness of beliefs. It can be said that truth maintenance performs inference in AEL
if IN label is identified with L and OUT label with ¬L. Establishing relationship between
TMSs and non-monotonic logic should allow a logical analysis of non-existence of any labelling
or the difference between negated assumptions and OUT-assumptions. For details refer to the
Reinfrank’s paper [52].
12 Relation to OWL and RDF
This section explores applications of the techniques from previous sections in the area of se-
mantic technologies.
Broekstra and Kampman [8] explore the possibility of using a JTMS-inspired algorithm to
remove statements from RDF triple stores. Their algorithm is based on tracking dependencies
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Figure 17: Dual representation to the classical representation in Figure 16.
between triples using justifications. They use justifications to be able to determine consequences
of a removed triple that have to be removed as well. They point out that, besides triple
removal, the dependency relations between statements are necessary for high-level services on
RDF repositories such as change tracking and statement-level security. They implemented the
algorithm in the Sesame RDF store. One drawback of their approach is that they had to separate
RDF model theory inferences, which are optimized in Sesame to take advantage of RDF model
theory rule dependencies, and the algorithm that creates the justification dependency graph.
This was necessary because the delete operation needs to know about all possible dependencies
of a statement. It is also important to note that Broekstra and Kampman delete all justifications
of a statement together with the statement; their approach has a rather superficial resemblance
to the TMS algorithms presented in this paper. They conclude that their TMS approach
performs satisfactorily for medium sized (roughly up to 200 000 statements) data sets and the
expressiveness of RDF and RDF Schema. For comparison, Sesame system itself can cope with
data sets of 3 million statements.
Kiryakov and Ognyanov in their paper about tracking changes in RDF(S) repositories [39]
also discuss the Sesame TMS subsystem (which is now part of the Sesame project). They
make an interesting point that for some applications it is important to be able to distinguish
between statements that were explicitly added to the repository and those that deductively
follow from the explicitly added statements. Their approach forbids users to remove an inferred
statement directly. Removal of an inferred statement then can only be done by removing all of
its supporters.
Volz, Staab, and Motik in their paper about incremental maintenance of materialized on-
tologies [57, 58, 59] mention reason maintenance too but only to express their doubts about its
suitability for such a problem. Their doubts concern the fact that in the original TMS algo-
rithms justifications are never removed, only disabled. Their own approach to maintenance of
materialized ontologies is based on maintenance of dynamic Datalog programs and implemented
in the KAON Datalog engine http://kaon.semanticweb.org/.
The article by Kang and Lau [36] explores the use of belief revision for ontology updates.
They motivate their approach by giving a shopping example where two agents communicate
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about features of a digital camera. The shop owner and customer each have their own ontology
of products which are in conflict with one another though. To resolve that conflict, Kang and
Lay use the belief revision expansion, revision and contraction operators (see section 4). They
seem to be mixing belief revision with the Dependency Directed Backtracking algorithm used
in TMSs but they unfortunately do not explain the details. They refine their approach in a
later paper [37] where they do not mention DDB at all and integrate belief revision into an
ontological re-engineering method proposed by Gómez-Pérez et al. (2004). The paper concludes
by stressing the need to investigate efficient computational methods to be able to apply the
technique to large and multiple ontologies.
Gutierrez et al. [33, 34] take a more formal and complete approach to the problem of updates
in RDF than the previously presented articles. Their approach uses the Katsuno-Mendelzon
framework [38] to define model-theoretic semantics of “erasure operation” on RDF (called this
way to distinguish it from the AGM contraction operation). The Katsuno-Mendelzon frame-
work builds on the AGM belief revision theory. Katsuno and Mendelzon argued [38] that no
rationality postulates for making belief revision will be adequate for every application and they
also clearly distinguished two types of revisions: proper revision and update. The proper re-
vision deals with new information about static world whereas update brings the knowledge
base up to date when the world it describes changes. Katsuno and Mendelzon claim that the
AGM postulates (see Section 4) describe only revision. Gutierrez et al. concentrate on up-
date which, as they and Katsuno and Mendelzon claim, is prevalent; it includes the updates
for which databases are usually used. The approach by Gutierrez et al. is more complete
because they consider removing inferred triples too (that is triples that were not added ex-
plicitly). They define a semantics for update in RDF and concentrate on the characterization
of the erase operation and its consequences over the formulas expressible in RDF. They also
define the erasure operator (which is a Katsuno-Mendelzon analog to the contraction operator
of AGM belief revision) and show that it cannot be faithfully represented in RDF because RDF
has neither negation or disjunction. They show how to approximate the erasure operation by
computing erasure candidates which then amounts to finding certain minimal cuts in the RDF
graph. The problem of finding whether a graph is an erasure candidate can be done in PTIME,
as they show. Other recent papers, such as [29], take a similar approach, also based on the
Katsuno-Mendelzon framework.
13 Conclusion
Presently, the Semantic web shifts from a read-only web to a read/write web [7] and, at the
same time, many traditional web applications turn to social media. These changes bring new
requirements on software and information processing in general. The techniques presented
in this paper are among the possible tools to build on so as to address the new challenges
resulting from the above mentioned changes. The techniques presented in this paper can be
seen as complementary forms of so called “defeasible reasoning”. This paper focuses primarily
on two of them: “belief revision” and “reason maintenance”.
Both belief revision and reason maintenance solve a similar problem – how to update existing
information. Belief revision takes a more general approach. It studies the properties of rational
changes whereas reason maintenance is more pragmatic and focuses on problem solving and
updates of knowledge bases. In other words, belief revision tries to capture the nature of beliefs
and how they change when confronted with new information whereas reason maintenance serves
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mainly as a service to an inference engine to make it easier to build a generic problem solver.
This observation is supported by the focus of the papers that have been published in these two
fields. Belief revision makes (supposedly) rational changes but encounters problems for example
when it has to deal with consecutive changes, i.e., iterated belief revision. Change operators in
belief revision depend on epistemic entrenchment which is, however, local to a “belief set” and
it is not known what the epistemic entrenchment should look like after an operator is applied;
in other words, AGM theory studies one-step revision. This restriction is addressed by so called
“iterated belief revision” (see for example [50]). However, according to the latest results [51],
iterated belief revision is in conflict with a desired property called relevance as formalized by
Parikh. Relevance is defined as follows: When a belief state ϕ is revised by new information
ψ, only the part of ϕ that is related to ψ should be affected; the rest should remain the same.
Belief revision papers seem to be striving for an ideal, rational update process. They consider
applications only "afterwards" (with the exception, perhaps, of multi-agent systems). On the
other hand, reason maintenance papers tend to focus on practical issues: more efficient problem
solving in case of Doyle’s JTMS, more efficient model-based diagnostic software in case of de
Kleer’s ATMS and HTMS, embedded real-time execution kernel for which ITMS was used.
Reason maintenance approaches do not try to always make rational changes. They sometimes
even make a random, or arbitrary choice when it has to be chosen which assumption to remove
so as to restore consistency. An attempt, based on the so called cognitive dissonance theory,
has been made to replace these random, or arbitrary choices by a more human-like choice [54].
Both belief revision and reason maintenance have a large body of scientific literature, par-
ticularly belief revision is a very lively field, so a more focused research would be needed to
determine the feasibility of these approaches in the area of social media. On the other hand,
with a practical application in mind, more seems to be in favour of reason maintenance due to
its more pragmatic grounding.
In both cases, however, extensions and adaptations of these approaches would be necessary
to meet the needs of social media that were partially identified in the motivating scenarios
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2) and in [9]. These needs are: paraconsistency, explanation, and coping
with rules with variables, i.e., beyond propositional logic and the Boolean case traditionally
considered in reason maintenance and beleif revision.
Most of the theories presented in this paper are based on consistency and usually are within
propositional logic, i.e., they do not admit rules with variables. As seen from the Specification
review and Paraconsistency scenarios given in Section 2, social software would benefit from the
stronger expressiveness offered by a richer language allowing for variables – it is desirable to
be able to express for example a rule like R4: needsRevision(x) ∧ reviewer(x, r) → todo(x, r),
whih states that everything needing a revision and that has been assigned to a reviewer is
on the reviewer’s todo list. The Specification review scenario (Section 2.1) assumes a work in
progress towards some goal. If a tool is to support a work in progress, then it has to cope
with inconsistencies, as inconsistencies in general cannot be avoided in work in progress. Hence
the requirement for paraconsistency. Neither reason maintenance nor belief revision support
paraconsistent reasoning. Reason maintenance algorithms typically remove inconsistency as
soon as it occurs and the main stream of belief revision is based on deductive closures of belief
sets, i.e., implicitly assumes that belief is consistent. Semantically enhanced social software are
likely to have a rather complex logic and even more so if it supports non-monotonic reasoning
and paraconsistency. Therefore it is desirable to help users by providing explanations. Providing
explanations is a difficult issue and, in reason maintenance, it is usually limited to delivering
the justification dependency tree. We sketched a similar, basic approach to a simple form of
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explanation in [9]. There is no such a clear way to produce explanations in belief revision that
we are aware of.
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